June 14…Ed. Research and the -isms
At the end of Chapter 6, Pring warns us to “beware of the
-isms…”. That said, try to make sense of where you see Pring fitting in,
“-ism-wise.” Feel free to draw on Paul and 702 here (or not).
May 31…Becker (Ch. 1)
Do you see any overlaps between Becker’s talk about writing and what we’ve discussed so far in this class?
Josh here:
ReplyDeleteI see Pring predominantly as a pragmatist. While he introduces some challenges and complications to the positivist tradition, he most often slides back towards a more neutral position regarding research methodology, ontology, and epistemology without ever addressing the axiomatic threats posed by those critiques. His skepticism of quantitative methodology as the authoritative mode of research makes me think he’s not quite a post-positivist, and generally, he lacks a critical theoretical lens throughout his discussion of educational philosophy. There is a case to be made for some constructivism at work in his discussion of the mediation of reality by individual perceptions, but he backs off from the true relativistic position of constructivism by implying the persistence of an objective reality, albeit impossible to fully ascertain.
Cassandra
DeleteI would agree with you. When we read Paul in 702, I recall there being something about researches supportive of more than one research philosophy. Pragmatism in theory is about justified beliefs and warranted assertions, which we definitely see in previous chapters. I would not agree with the constructivism piece, I would argue that he is still operating under pragmatism in that knowledge is constructed piece.
I hesitate to put Pring in a box because I don’t see him as fitting nicely into any of the –isms that we have discussed in both 702 and this class. At the risk of sounding like a cop-out, I think Pring’s beliefs are probably closer aligned to post-modernism, though I don’t think he really is one in the true spirit of post-modernism. I had to go back and re-read all of the previous chapters, but two big themes stood out to me.
ReplyDeletePring takes a Wittgenstein-ian approach to the idea of language and meaning. For example, in chapter 2, Pring puts a lot of focus on the meaning of terms and words. One can argue that he was simply trying to define these terms, but I think in chapter 2 there is an emphasis on what these terms mean to the education researcher and how we approach research as a whole. He discusses key concepts on chapter 6 as well, but there is a clear distinction between the two chapters. In chapter 6 there seems to be less of a focus on what these terms actually mean. He also presents a short critique of logical positivism in chapter 7 where he questions logical positivism’s reduction of statements to either those that have meaning and those that don’t. It seems to me that he takes issue with the fact that some statements could have no meaning – when he feels that everything has meaning and can be explained in relation to social structures and social need.
At times when he is offering his own opinion, I also noticed that he puts a lot of focus on not only making meaning out of words, but also out of the experiences of others in relation to society, cultural backgrounds and personal experiences - more of an interpretivist approach perhaps?
That being said, I wonder if it is possible for a researcher to identify with just one –ism, or is it a case of falling on a spectrum of –isms?
Shannon
DeleteI definitely agree on researchers fitting into more than one paradigm and actually pointed a bit more toward pragmatism using some of the same examples you noted. Looking back at Paul, a section about pragmatism's interest in emphasizing the impact of vocabularies on our thoughts and actions stood out to me and I saw that in Pring's early discussion on educational research. He takes great care to build a history of educational research as a concept, including its roots and perceptions in the past/present, that helps create context. Perhaps he feels he lays the groundwork early on, but it almost feels as if he abandons this position later, at least in terms of feeling the need to place concepts in a historical context.
Virginia here:
ReplyDeleteIn 702 when we read the chapter by Paul on the most commonly found –isms in educational research we discussed that scholars often align/identify with more than one –ism and generally the perspective they drew from was determined by their research question and study. I think Pring warns readers of the strict nature of the –isms, because researchers find themselves somewhere on a continuum of the perspectives rather than firmly planted within one. Pring himself is hard to identify, perhaps due to the same reason he warns us. I am not really sure where he falls among the –isms. I agree with Josh that he could most align with pragmatism, because he seems to use logical reasoning in his discussions throughout the book. He also talks about personal experience and individual sense making of the world, so he could align with constructivism or interpretivism. However, his warnings of misinterpretation do not have me convinced.
If I had started counting the amount of times I have opened up the Paul chapter to further grasp philosophical isms I think we could all have a good laugh. After reading the previous posts, I agree both with Josh and Virginia that if we could fit Pring into an ism box he would most align with that of a Pragmatist. Pulling from Paul’s chapter (p.46) where it gives the nice philosophical overview chart that I have referenced often, the methodology section for a pragmatist states, “The inquirer recognizes that the scientific method is effective but contains inherent uncertainties”. I believe this aligns with the fact he split up the Chapter 5 separating qualitative and quantitative research practices so distinctly.
ReplyDeletePragmatists also believe truth will be applied to society so social constructs should be taken into understanding of the researcher’s values. In terms of conducting educational research I think Pring lets his bias come through about developing the whole learner through theory and practice of the research. Pring dove into a lot of this in Chapter 3 when he discussed the focus of educational research and the values of researchers.
However, I do agree with Melissa and Virginia that isms of philosophical perspectives lie on a spectrum. I do not think Pring would put himself in a box but would align with multiple philosophical perspectives depending on the topic of research and the research questions driving the methodological approach of that study.
Jen U:
ReplyDeletePring labels himself a realist, a robust realist to be exact. Of the philosophical orientations outlined in Paul, I see Pring's explanation of robust realism aligning most closely with pragmatism. His critiques of constructivism focus on the ways in which it is not practical or useful. He consistently discusses reality as a boundary on social constructions and states that any construction must stand up to use in real life. At the same time, he also dismisses naïve realism as too simple and not representative of people's experiences. Robust realism seems to be his way of finding the useful parts of both viewpoints and combining them in a way to make sense of life and experiences.
Morgan DeBusk-Lane
ReplyDeleteMuch of what I felt during 702 was that the paradigms don't exist in any explicitly isolated way. In other words, and similar to Virginia’s take, it seems that as researchers we tend to fall in or around some type of continuum between maybe a few different paradigms. Nevertheless, this is the essence of Pring’s warning. I, personally, see no harm in -isms if they help interpret where someone sits in regards to their ontological or epistemological frame of reference. Again, however, this is Pring’s warning, whereby there may not actually be such a thing. Not many researchers very clearly or expressively state exactly where they are coming from or what -ism they are expressing. It’s simply not that clear. Pring is a clear example of that, or at least that is my blind interpretation (because it is not simply expressed clearly or obviously). Taking things, such as how a researcher shapes their ontological or epistemological argument, at face value is fully of complications, bias, stereotypes, and any number of problems. It seems that to clearly set the frame, discuss it, and explicitly define the theoretical framework, theory of knowledge, and use is the only way to improve this issue.
Michael Here:
ReplyDeleteTo quote Pring, “The position espoused here might be roughly described as robust realism” (p.108). I do not know what exactly robust realism, but I would call it pragmatism, which means I agree with Josh as well. I also think he has this great fear of dualism, or maybe it isn’t fear, so much as he wants to be clear pluralism exists, and since it exists researchers need to take note.
Pring has a desire to look at the affect -isms have on research, and his arguments seems to side with the idea most social science issues require multiple perspectives to even begin to understand what exactly is occurring in a specific event. Moreover, there is more harm done when researchers do not account for multiple perspectives than when they do. My only thought opposing this is idea, is the social constructivism of knowledge whereby being pluralistic you exclude others from contributing to the creation of knowledge. I think this is where the limitations section in research articles can be a great place to reflect on the areas in which you don’t write about, or are not engaged in attaching an -ism.
The other thing I keep on thinking about, and this is probably just a holdover from middle school debate class, but in crafting an argument there should be some doggedness attached to it. I appreciate Dr. Stemhagen saying I am a Pragmatic Deweyan scholar and this is the lens I use. Now, there is of course a discussion which follows, but this could be just because he is a Pragmatic Deweyan scholar, maybe a structuralist would say something different. Anyway, I am digressing a bit, so I’ll end it.
Ashlee:
ReplyDeleteI agree with Josh's explanation of Pring's stance on constructivism. At first read I thought that Pring fit well into the constructivist world in that he seems to highlight the role and importance of individual interpretation of experiences and social constructions. However, upon further investigation it is evident that Pring advocates that a singular reality does in fact exist. He seems to suggest that people may interpret and experience the world differently as long as these interpretations fit within what is actual reality. But, I would dare to question Pring, wondering who it is that decides what defines this "actual reality." From this frame it seems clear that Pring is in no way a constructivist.
Thus, I would agree with the resounding voice here that Pring is more a pragmatist than anything else. However, I think it is important; as others have mentioned, to head Pring’s warning, and not blindly accept whichever -ism seems to mostly align with work as researchers are often unclear. Instead, we must be critical consumers of research and question what biases may be underlying a scholar’s approach to answering each question. Or, as Morgan suggests, we as a field could simply move towards requiring researchers to explicitly state and define the paradigm under which they are working. This requirement would encourage scholars to be reflected on their own biases while also lightening the burden of the reader to “read between the lines” to unearth the inherent biases of the work.
Melissa Cuba
ReplyDeleteSimilar to what others have expressed, Pring does not fit into one -ism. Pring positions himself as a realist and shares ideas that align with pragmatism as well as constructivism and the ethics approach. He focuses on the meaning-constructing nature of language, which is validated through his perspective on ontological and epistemological use. He also implies individuals may not be able to reveal the ideal good, however the scientific method and inquiry process gives researchers the most effective tools to form warranted beliefs. I also say constructivism and the ethics approach because he speaks of inquiry and evaluation as not being dependent of social context and different perspectives. Importance is placed on creating a collaborative dialogical approach that includes common sense beliefs and technical discourse.
I find it interesting, as I read many of these comments, that often people find their own perspective in the chapter of Pring. Yes, as we talked in class, with Pring being a pragmatist, the others could fall "under it" so we could identify with it. At the same time, as it was pointed out, in 702, researchers can and should shift the paradigms they use depending on the outcomes of their projects. This makes me think about a book that I have read in my study of Ed.Leadership called True North. Though we can shift our direction for projects, we can't and shouldn't stray too far.
ReplyDeleteHannah
ReplyDeleteI agree with what most people said so far--that and I could definitely see Pring as a pragmatist. My biggest argument for Pring and pragmatism is in Ch 6 where he discusses causal explanations and explaining human behavior. Pring argues that "what I have explained above would support the view that, difficult though it is, one might specify the conditions wherein, more often than not, intervention X will cause event Y to occur" (p.83). This very much ties together with the summary of pragmatic theory of meaning by Pierce which states, "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object" (Paul, p. 57). While it is a small instance, it is an example of Pring's perspective, which is practical, straightforward, and... subtly pragmatic.
"The teacher, caught in the complex practical world of the classroom, needs to see where the theoretical account latches onto his or her quite different universe of discourse. The theorist needs to show where theory corrects or improves the common-sense beliefs that inform a teacher's practice" (Pring, 106).
ReplyDeleteI am troubled by the construction of the term theory without an article. In chapter 7 Pring writes about facts and "objects of observation:" "Are they things like churches and schools? Or are they the bricks and mortar, which, put together, we (but possibly not others from a different culture) call churches and schools? Or are they the uninterpreted perception of colours, shapes, sounds - the phenomena of direct experience?" (110). What if in the above sentences we replace "they the" with "there;" are there things like churches and schools? With this in mid, I would refer back to Pring's claim that theorists should demonstrate the congruence of their theories with common sense. This seems to be a hallmark of pragmatism.